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Abstract
The primary function of access controls is to restrict the use of information systems and other computer resources
to authorised users only. Although more secure alternatives exist, password-based systems remain the
predominant method of user authentication. Prior research shows that password security is often compromised
by users who adopt inadequate password composition and management practices. One particularly underresearched area is whether formal password composition policies actually lead to more secure passwords and
user security practices. Consequently, this study investigates empirically the efficacy of using password
composition rules to improve password security. The results show that the enforcement of password composition
rules does not significantly reduce the use of meaningful data. While the enforcement of rules does reduce
password reuse, the overall incidence remains high. These passwords are also perceived by users as being more
difficult to remember. Finally, the enforcement of password composition rules significantly increases the average
Levenshtein's edit distance between the passwords and ordinary dictionary words indicating that enforcement
does improve protection against dictionary-based attack.

Keywords
Password authentication, password policy, computer security

INTRODUCTION
Although better authentication systems exist (e.g., see Boukhonine et al. 2005), password-based authentication
remains the most commonly used means of controlling access to computer-based resources. Passwords are
conceptually simple for both system designers and end users, and can provide effective protection if they are
used correctly. Unfortunately, users sometimes compromise password security through forgetfulness, by writing
them down, sharing them with other people and by selecting easily guessed words. These weaknesses are known
to seriously undermine the efficacy of computer system security (Conklin et al. 2004, Carstens 2004, Ives et al.
2004, Furnell et al. 1999, Jobusch and Oldehoeft 1989, Spafford 1992, Zviran and Haga 1999).
A consequence of these weaknesses is that organisations often rely on password composition policies to force
users to create more secure passwords. This is usually implemented in such a way as to provide an explicit
framework that constrains user choices during the password composition process. However, little is known about
how user behaviours are changed except that it is difficult for users to create passwords that are both secure and
easy to remember (Yan et al. 2004). To this end, our primary research question is: Does the enforcement of
password composition policy lead to better password choices?

ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF ENFORCED PASSWORD COMPOSITION RULES
Password authentication systems are commonly used for securing access to IT devices such as PDAs, laptop
computers and desktop computers. These passwords are usually stored in a special secure storage space on the IT
device itself and are also sometimes used to gain access to network resources. These passwords are vulnerable to
attack in three ways:
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•

Password guessing: The weakest passwords are those that can be easily guessed. The easiest way to guess a
password is to start with a dictionary of common words, slang, and popular phrases. It is then relatively easy
to write a program to mimic a human logging on to a web-based application using combinations user logon
codes and guessed passwords (Zhang 2005).

•

Social engineering: Perpetrators will attempt to exploit the gullibility of users by pretending to be
somebody trustable. Even the most careful user can be sufficiently lulled into a false sense of security to
disclose personal information and sometimes even passwords (Adams and Sasse 1999, Haggerty and Taylor
2005). The impact of social engineering on password security is not the primary focus of this paper as weak
and strong passwords are equally vulnerable to social engineering attack.

•

Password cracking: password cracking requires the encrypted version of the password. The encrypted
version can be accessed via network sniffing (especially in wireless networks), virus implanting (Bento and
Bento 2004), and through Spy Ware such as PPAuditor or RainbowCrack (Symantec 2006a, 2006b). With
the increasing prevalence of mobile devices, it is becoming easier for perpetrators to gain access to an
encrypted password stored on a mobile device.

Password composition policies are meant to reduce the risk of attack by forcing users to compose passwords that
are not easy to guess or that have similarities to common dictionary words (Piscitello and Kent 2003).
Unfortunately, complex passwords are also more difficult to remember and users are sometimes tempted to write
them down or to keep an electronic copy stored in a mobile phone, computer, or on other storage device. In terms
of our research question, we assess the impact of password composition policy on the known weaknesses in userdefined passwords. These are: the use of meaningful data, memorability, and similarity to dictionary words.
Passwords Composed with Meaningful Information
There are a range of utilities available that enforce password composition rules. For example, Microsoft provides
the capability for a system administrator to set a restrictive password policy that enforces password aging,
minimal length, or a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers or symbols etc. (Microsoft 2006). It is
generally assumed that rule enforcement does actually lead to more secure passwords. Surprisingly however,
there is no research evidence that this is the case. However, evidence from earlier research does suggest that well
documented security policies do not by themselves lead to more secure systems (Foltz et al. 2005). Consequently,
restrictions on password composition may not prevent users from compromising system security by choosing
vulnerable passwords containing meaningful data. For example, consider the following password criteria based
on good password practice (Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2003):
•

Password should not contain all or part of the users account name

•

Password should be at least 8 characters long

•

Password is not ‘password’ or a deviation thereof; or left blank

•

Password contains characters from three of the following four categories:
- English uppercase characters (A…Z)
- English lowercase characters (a…z)
- Base 10 digits (0…9)
- Non-alphanumeric (!@#$%^&* etc.)

While the various elements of this policy appear to adequately address traditional password weaknesses, it is
relatively easy to compose examples containing large amounts of meaningful information, but that still satisfy all
the requirements of the policy. For example: Broncos#1, NinaLee05, =Lunatic=, Diamond*, etc. While each of
these examples satisfies the password composition rules listed above, these particular combinations could still be
easily guessed or hacked. Nevertheless, as the intention of composition rules is to reduce the meaningful
information contained in passwords, we will test the following proposition:
P1: The enforcement of password composition rules will reduce the meaningful information contained
in user-defined passwords.
Password Memorability
Due to the predominance of password authentication systems, many users are required to remember passwords
for a range of different systems and applications. Remembering a unique password for each system can be
difficult for users. It is therefore no surprise that many users select dictionary words, personal names or other
meaningful information as the basis for their passwords because they are easier to remember. For similar reasons
users frequently select the same password for multiple accounts (Ives et al. 2004). As such, should an intruder
obtain the password of one protected account, it is quite likely that he will be able to reuse that password, or a
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close variation thereof, to gain access to other devices or computer applications belonging to the same individual.
In this context, password composition rules are expected to result in passwords that are less similar to earlier
password choices but, as a result, will be more difficult to remember. Consequently, we test the two propositions:
P2: The enforcement of password composition rules will reduce password reuse.
P3: The enforcement of password composition rules will produce passwords that are difficult to
remember.
Password Similarity to Common Dictionary Words
Passwords containing common dictionary words can be cracked within minutes and sometimes even seconds. We
found that a modest desktop computer (Intel Pentium 4, 2.4 GHz, without Hyper-Threading turned on) running
the Fedora Core 5 operating system can complete a crypt1 function in about 10 microseconds creating the
capacity to test up to 105 passwords in one second. Checking all of the 479,625 words contained in the Fedora
Core 5 English spell-checking dictionary takes approximately 5 seconds. Consequently, the paramount objective
of enforcing password composition policy is to ensure that users create passwords that are less susceptible to
dictionary-based attack. Consequently, we test the following proposition:
P4: The enforcement of password composition rules will produce passwords that are less similar to
dictionary words.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The research employs an experimental research design where participants are randomly allocated to one of two
main study groups. As described in Figure 1, the two groups cover unrestricted password composition (Group A
– the experimental control group) and restricted password composition (Group B - the experimental treatment
group). Each of these study groups was then exposed to different password composition criteria and asked to
compose and change a password for a hypothetical work-based computer account using an online password
interface designed for this purpose. The research context and password composition tasks were designed to
simulate the experience of a password composition exercise for a new employee. Details of the experimental
protocol for each group are provided in Table 1.

Research Task Condition 1:
Participants can compose
passwords without restriction

Research Task Condition 2:
Participants can only compose
passwords that satisfy strict
composition rules

Unrestricted password set
(Group A)

Constrained password set
(Group B)

Influence of
Password Composition Policy
Figure 1: Impact of password composition policy on user-defined passwords

Data
The research experiment was conducted in June 2006 and involved 62 undergraduate student participants
studying within an Australian university business faculty. This cohort was sampled so as to provide indicative
1

crypt(3) is widely used for Un*x password encryption. Although different password encryption algorithms are
available, the performance of crypt(3) provides a reasonable benchmark for password cracking speed.
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information on the password composition behaviour that university educated recruits might bring into new
employment positions within organisations operating in the knowledge economy. Students were approached in
tutorial classes with each class being randomly allocated to a treatment or control group. This resulted in 27
individuals participating in the control group environment (Group A), and 35 individuals participating in the
treatment group environment (Group B). As well as the password composition tasks described above in Table 1,
participants were also asked to complete a short survey which is listed in the Appendix.
General Instructions Provided
To Both Groups

Instructions for the No
Enforcement Rules Group

We are giving you this instruction sheet as
part of the password security experiment
that is described in the attached Research
Participant Information Sheet. If you agree
to participate in this study, you are required
to put yourself in the place of a new
graduate employee. As part of your
induction you have been given details
about a password protected computer
account for accessing email and other
online organizational resources. You would
usually be required to log on to this
account every day as part of your normal
work duties. You will also be required to
remote access this account using an
Internet connection when you are working
away from the office. This might occur
once or twice a week.

Step 1
Please go to the following web address:
{online survey web address}
If you do not wish to participate in this study,
please use the mouse to click on the “NO”
button and then return this instruction sheet.
If you do agree to participate, then please
enter your Logon Code and Default Password
and click the “YES” button.

Your task here is to compose a new
password for your work-based computer
account and then to answer a brief online
survey. Completing this task should take
between 5 and 10 minutes. Please ensure
that you observe all of the instructions
contained in the following three steps.

Step 2
Choose and enter your new password in the
required fields. When you have successfully
created your new password, please click the
continue button.
Step 3
Please complete all survey questions and then
click the continue button to conclude the
research task.

Instructions for the Enforcement
Rules Group
Step 1
Please go to the following web address:
{online survey web address}
If you do not wish to participate in this
study, please use the mouse to click on the
“NO” button and then return this
instruction sheet. If you do agree to
participate, then please enter your Logon
Code and Default Password and click the
“YES” button.
Step 2
Choose and enter your new password in the
required fields. For security purposes, your
new password will not be accepted unless it
satisfies the following requirements:
• Password does not contain all or part of
the users account name
• Password is at least 8 characters long
• Password is not ‘password’ or a
deviation thereof, or left blank
• Password must contain characters from
three of the following four categories:
o English uppercase characters (A…Z)
o English lowercase characters (a…z)
o Base 10 digits (0…9)
o Non-alphanumeric (!@#$%^&* etc.)
When you have successfully created your
new password, please click the continue
button.
Step 3
Please complete all survey questions and
then click the continue button to conclude
the research task.

Table 1: Experimental instructions and password composition tasks for the control and treatment groups

RESULTS
Passwords Containing Meaningful Information
Participants were asked whether the password chosen contained meaningful data such as a name, birth year etc.
or was composed using some other approach such as a pass-phrase, pronounceable phrase or random keyboard
characters. The enforcement of password composition policy has reduced the meaningful information contained
in passwords (from 29.4 percent down to 11.4 percent of passwords), but not the use of combinations of
meaningful information such as a name in combination with a birth date (from 16.7 percent in the control group
increasing to 42.9 percent for the enforced policy group).
Inferential statistical testing was used to asses Proposition 1. Because of sample size restrictions, the responses
were recoded into a dichotomous variable with meaningful and combination of meaningful data responses coded
with a value of one. All other response choices were recoded with a zero. A subsequent chi-square test
established that there was no statistical difference between each group in relation to the use of meaningful data
within passwords, χ2 (1, N=59) = .407, p<.262. Therefore, we conclude that Proposition 1 is not supported and
that the enforcement of password composition rules does not reduce the amount of meaningful information
contained in user-defined passwords.
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Password Reuse and Memorability
Participants were asked whether the password chosen was the same, similar or completely different from one
used in the past. Table 2 shows the distribution of responses by participants in each of our two groups. The
impact of enforced password composition policy appears to have decreased the incidence of password reuse
(53.8 percent in the control group compared to 17.6 percent in the enforced policy group). A subsequent chisquare test established that there was a statistical difference between each group in relation to password reuse, χ2
(2, N=60) = 8.725, p<.013. This result supports Proposition 2 which stated that the enforcement of password
composition rules will reduce password reuse.
To assess memorability, participants were asked how likely they would be able to remember their new password
by the next day and by the next week. A t-test for independent groups was used to assess the differences between
the group perceptions for both the one and seven day time periods. There was no significant difference between
expectations of the control group (M=4.42, SD=1.065) and the experimental group (M=4.11, SD=1.207) over a
one day period, t(59)=1.038, p=.165. However, there was a significant difference in expectations between the
control group (M=4.27, SD=1.151) and the experimental group (M=3.60, SD=1.143) over a seven day period,
t(59)=2.255, p=.014. Although both groups expect to still be able to remember their password the next day, the
enforced composition rules group perceived their passwords to be more difficult to remember over a slightly
longer period of one week. Based on these results, we conclude that Proposition 3 is supported and the
enforcement of password composition rules do produce passwords that are more difficult to remember over time.

Experimental Condition
No enforcement

Enforced policy

Has been
used before

Is similar to
one used before

Not used before

Totals

14

6

6

26

53.8%

23.1%

23.1%

100%

6

13

15

34

17.6%

38.2%

44.1%

100%

Table 2: Incidence of password reuse for each experimental group
Passwords Similarity with Dictionary Words
A measure of password vulnerability to dictionary style attack can be tested by assessing the similarity between a
password string and common dictionary words using Levenshtein's edit distance (Levenshtein 1965). This metric
calculates the distance between two strings by counting and then adding the minimal number of single character
manipulations required, such as an insertion or deletion, to make the string values equivalent (Stephen 1994).
The Fedora Core 5 English dictionary (Fedora 2006) was used to generate a Levenshtein's edit distance score for
each password based on its closest dictionary word. Although more comprehensive dictionaries would most
likely be used for password cracking purposes, this dictionary is adequate for the purpose of demonstrating the
differences between the treatment and control groups. Table 3 shows the distribution of distance measures for
each group. The differences between the experimental control and treatment groups are quite marked. The
control group appears to have two distributions of distances – the first contained passwords that ranged from zero
to two edit distances, and the second cluster containing passwords that ranged from four to six single character
edits. In contrast, the enforced policy group created passwords with edit distances ranging from two through to
eight. Statistical testing indicated that the Levenshtein's edit distances are significantly higher where the password
composition rules were enforced (M=4.63, SD=1.416) in comparison to the unconstrained group (M=3.37,
SD=1.964), t(60)= -2.931, p=.005). Therefore, Proposition 4 is also supported as the enforcement of password
composition rules produces passwords that are less similar to a standard dictionary of words.
A closer inspection of the data reveals that almost 26 percent of the control group (no enforced composition
policy) had a Levenshtein's edit distance of two or fewer. While the lowest edit distance for the enforced policy
group was two which accounted for a little less than six percent of passwords created by this group. While this
result is a significant improvement over having no password composition rules, further improvement is clearly
still required.
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Levenshtein’s edit distance
0

1

2

2

5

7.4%

18.5%

3

7

8

Totals

4

5

6

3

10

2

5

27

11.1%

37.0%

7.4%

18.5%

100%

2

6

8

10

6

2

1

35

5.7%

17.1%

22.9%

28.6%

17.1%

5.7%

2.9
%

100%

Table 3: Levenshtein’s edit distance calculated based on the standard Fedora Core 5 English dictionary.

DISCUSSION
The motivation for this research was to investigate the impact of password composition rules on password
security. In order to answer this question, we first examined how the enforcement of password composition rules
might discourage users from reusing passwords and using meaningful information. We also examined password
memorability and measured the distance between passwords and common dictionary words. From the data it
appears that enforced password composition rules do not discourage the use of meaningful information in
passwords. While there is a significant reduction in password reuse, the level of reuse reported by participants
remains very high (more 54 percent of participants reported that they chose passwords containing meaningful or
a combination of meaningful data). Also, participants perceive that these passwords are less memorable over a
relatively short time-frame of one week. Altogether, the findings are cause for concern as they indicate that the
enforced composition rules used in this study are ineffectual on these intransigent user behaviours. An analysis of
the Levenshtein’s edit distances show that both groups are relatively safe from dictionary-based attack. However,
there remain significant numbers of passwords generated by both study groups that are highly susceptible to
dictionary-based attack.
The results from this study provide important insight into ongoing issues relating to the creation and management
of user-based password management systems. While the results highlight some of the benefits of enforcing
password composition rules, the overall findings are far from emphatic. While enforced composition rules
improved password strength, they did little to reduce the vulnerabilities caused by the use of meaningful
information, password reuse or user forgetfulness. Consequently, organisations should not rely solely on the
enforcement of password composition rules to ensure password security. Future research is required to better
understand how different password policy environments might improve password security by encouraging
positive user behaviours.
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APPENDIX
Online Survey Questions
For each of the following question, please tick the box that best applies to you.
What is your age group?  Less than 18 years
 18-25 years  26-35 years
 36-45 years
 46-55 years  More than 55 years
What is your gender?
Are you enrolled at university?
Are you employed?

 Male
 Full time
 Full time

How long have you been using a computer?
 0 - 2 years
 3-5 years
 6-10 years

 Female
 Part time
 Part time

 Not enrolled
 Not employed

 More than 10 years

Is the password that you have just created one that you have used in the past?
 Yes
 Not at all
 Password has a similarity to another password that I have used before
How did you choose your password?
 Meaningful detail (eg. name, date, street, registration number)
 Combination of meaningful details (eg. Bill2000, 4jun88)
 Pronounceable password (eg. one4you, 2Bfree)
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 Using the first letter from each word in a special phrase (eg. “my cat is called Tom” to create the password
mcicT)
 Random combination of characters (eg. Qcar8&t, CoLL186+)
 Other, please specify
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
If you had to rely on your memory alone, how likely are you to be able to remember this password within 1 day
from now?
Very
Very
Likely
Unlikely





If you had to rely on your memory alone, how likely are you to be able to remember this password within 1 week
from now?
Very
Very
Likely
Unlikely





What steps might you take to help you remember this password?
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
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